2020 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

1-21-2020

Albert Frazier v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020

Recommended Citation
"Albert Frazier v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 59.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/59

This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 19-1514
_____________
ALBERT FRAZIER,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-0872)
District Judge: Hon. David S. Cercone
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 17, 2020
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 21, 2020)
_______________
OPINION
_______________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Albert James Frazier appeals the dismissal of his habeas petition. He argues that
the limitations placed on his cross-examination of a key government witness infringed his
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. We disagree and will affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises from a drug sale turned violent. On October 2, 2004, Frazier led

two men to believe he was going to engage in a drug transaction with them. His two
counterparts drove to the designated place, and when they arrived, Frazier and another
man entered the back seat of the car while a third man stood in front of the car. When the
driver of the car turned to look behind him, Frazier pointed a gun at him and told him not
to move. Gunfire erupted. The driver stepped on the gas pedal, and the car went over a
hill and crashed. Though wounded, both the driver and the passenger were able to exit
the car. The driver survived, but the passenger died from his wounds. Frazier was
charged with criminal homicide, two counts of criminal conspiracy, criminal attempt,
aggravated assault, and a violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act.
At trial, the driver of the car testified, identifying Frazier as one of his assailants.
The driver was facing drug charges based on a subsequent incident, and, before the driver
was called as a witness, the prosecution sought to exclude questioning about those
charges. Frazier’s counsel objected, pointing to the scheduling of the driver’s case, and
saying “every time that our case is listed for trial, his case … gets postponed.” (App. at
186a.) In an in limine ruling, the trial court instructed, “You may ask if he has any
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criminal matters pending. If he says yes, you may then ask if he expects any
consideration from the Commonwealth for his testimony here without detail as to charge,
without detail as to amounts of drugs or anything else.” (App. at 187a.)
On direct examination, anticipating the defense cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked the driver whether he had received “any consideration on any of [his] pending
cases to testify” against Frazier. (App. at 230a.) The driver said he had not. On crossexamination, defense counsel began by asking “you have a few pending cases, is that
correct?” (App. at 233a.) The driver first responded that he didn’t “want to talk about
that,” but subsequently confirmed that he had two cases pending. (App. at 233a.)
Defense counsel then said: “Now, we can’t get into the cases. I am not asking you to
divulge anything about the cases. I do want to discuss the timing, however.” (App. at
233a.) The prosecution then objected on the basis of the court’s previous in limine
ruling. Defense counsel explained that he had evidence of “the postponements and … the
court docket which would indicate that every time this case comes up for trial, his [the
driver’s] case follows. [Frazier’s] case gets postponed, that case gets postponed until just
after this homicide. I am simply asking him if he had expectations of that.” (App. at
234a.) The court responded that the objection was sustained, and defense counsel
resumed questioning the driver on another line of inquiry.
A jury found Frazier guilty on all charges, and he was sentenced to life
imprisonment for murder, plus twenty to forty years of imprisonment on the other
charges. Frazier appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed his conviction. Frazier
subsequently sought post-conviction relief in state court under Pennsylvania’s Post
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Conviction Collateral Relief Act, which was denied by the Court of Common Pleas, and
affirmed by the Superior Court. Thereafter, Frazier filed his federal habeas petition,
which the District Court dismissed. We granted a certificate of appealability on the issue
of whether Frazier’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court
limited his cross-examination of the driver and whether the federal constitutional aspect
of that claim was properly exhausted in the state courts.
II.

DISCUSSION1
Whether or not Frazier failed to exhaust his Confrontation Clause arguments in

state court, he has not satisfied the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) to show that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when
the trial court restricted his counsel’s questioning of the driver.
Under AEDPA, when a prisoner petitions for relief from a state court judgment in
a habeas proceeding, we will not grant relief “unless the adjudication of the claim …
result[s] in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States[.]”2 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Frazier’s argument thus depends on Supreme Court
case law interpreting the Confrontation Clause.

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). “Where, as here, the District
Court based its rulings on the evidence contained in the state court record and did not
conduct an evidentiary hearing or engage in any independent fact-finding, our review of
the District Court’s decision is plenary.” Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871
F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2017).
2

Another basis for habeas relief under AEDPA arises when a state court ruling
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The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. That right includes the right to crossexamine witnesses. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). But that right is not
unconditional. The Supreme Court has instructed that “the Confrontation Clause
guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20
(1985) (per curiam)). It “does not grant unfettered rights to cross-examine witnesses.”
United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 356 (3d Cir. 2011).
Consequently, the Confrontation Clause does not rob trial judges of the ability to
limit cross-examination when appropriate. “On the contrary, trial judges retain wide
latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on
such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or
only marginally relevant.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.
To begin with, we are skeptical that Frazier can show a Confrontation Clause
violation at all, especially given the high standard imposed by AEDPA. Such a violation
occurs only where “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different
impression of [the witness’] credibility.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. Here, however,

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
No one, however, contends that that provision is implicated in this case.
5

defense counsel was permitted to ask the driver whether he had charges pending against
him and whether he expected favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony. What
latitude the trial court may have given the defense to explore bias along that line is not
clear, as defense counsel was only prevented from trying to impeach the driver by
introducing evidence of the scheduling of the driver’s trial. Under those circumstances, it
is doubtful that the jury would have “received a significantly different impression” of the
driver’s testimony had counsel been permitted to cross-examine him about the timing of
his pending cases. Id.
But even if there were constitutional error, it was unquestionably harmless. Van
Arsdall instructs that the following factors bear upon harmlessness: “the importance of
the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative,
the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of
course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” 475 U.S. at 684. In this case,
while the driver was an important witness who provided non-cumulative testimony, the
other factors cut strongly the other way. Frazier was permitted to cross-examine the
driver to some extent about his bias, including about whether he had pending cases and
whether he expected any benefits in exchange for testifying. Equally important, the
driver’s testimony was corroborated by significant incriminating evidence, including
phone records showing that the passenger called Frazier just before the shooting, the
testimony from the mother of Frazier’s friend that Frazier was in the area at the time of
the shooting, and Frazier’s fingerprints that were found on both weapons and ammunition
6

of the type found at the scene. In light of this other evidence, the “overall strength of the
prosecution’s case” was substantial. Id. In sum, we conclude that Frazier cannot
establish the requisite prejudice, so, even if there were constitutional error, it was
harmless.
II.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.
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